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Values are the foundation
for our priorities, our
mission and our actions.

We Need to
Think About Values
Introduction
We do a lot of talking about values. In our vision or mission
statements we formulate the priorities by which we will act and
decide for the future. We talk about gospel values, Spiritan values,
democratic values, economic values, American values, family
values, personal values, and the like. Talking of values is part of
our political discourse, our moral discourse and our theological
and congregational discussions. We use the word every day. We
consider our values a central aspect of who we are and what
we stand for. Values are the foundation for our priorities, our
mission and our actions.
Yet in contrast to all the talk about values, we have almost
complete silence in terms of a discussion on what are values, where
do they come from, how do you distinguish between true and
false values, what is the difference between values and feelings,
how do you teach values. Why do we talk about moral values
rather than moral laws or virtues and vices? The philosophical
and theological tradition has discussed at length the morality of
right and wrong based on the natural law tradition or based on
the virtue ethics tradition. However, the language of values has
now crept into our discourse. Marx started talking about values
in economic terms. Nietzsche undermined traditional moral
values but also wrote about transvaluation of values in a rather
unorthodox sense. In the first half of the twentieth century the
phenomenologists, Max Scheler, Nicholai Hartmann, Dietrich
von Hildebrand, and others devoted some efforts to defining
values but the tradition has not been continued. For the last
sixty years, Lonergan is the only philosopher or theologian that I
know of who has given some theoretical account of what values
are and where they come from.1
It is not surprising then that there is considerable confusion
as to what a value is and whether we can know the difference
between true and false values. Alasdair MacIntyre asserts that the
most prevalent view of values in our present culture is emotivism,
namely, “that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all
moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference,
expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or
evaluative in character.”2 He goes on to say that such expressions
of feeling are neither true nor false as the category of true or false
does not apply to feelings. This attitude is indeed very common.
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It is common to think of values as personal preferences, as
arbitrary, as irrational, as relativistic, as incommensurable, as
beyond the scope of rational argument. If this were really so it
would lead to chaos. But this would seem to fly in the face of the
fact that we are evaluating, thinking and arguing about values all
the time and do strongly hold some values to be good and the
contrary to be evil. I think we can and must make some attempt
to defend the soundness of value judgments that underpin our
priorities and our actions.
What is the best way to do that? Lonergan’s innovation in
Insight was simply to attend to the activities of understanding
as they occur in fact in consciousness. From this method
follows everything else. Cognitional theory, epistemology and
metaphysics are based on the facts of how we come to know.
Can we do the same in ethics? Why not! Attend to the process
of evaluation, describe its emergence, components and causes,
distinguish evaluating in various spheres, and note how we
discriminate between good evaluating and bad evaluating. This is
what we plan to do in this short paper. We will carefully attend to
the process of evaluating. We will identify the three components
of cognitive, affective and volitional as they unite in a value
judgment. We will discover that the process is legitimate and
justifies our dealing with policies and morals in terms of values.

Whenever we use
expressions such as good,
better, best, or bad, worse,
worst, we are engaged in
the process of evaluating.

The Process of Evaluating
Whenever we use expressions such as good, better, best, or
bad, worse, worst, we are engaged in the process of evaluating.
We evaluate things, we evaluate people, we evaluate policies,
actions, food, climate, books: we are evaluating all the time. We
can do it well or badly, carefully or rashly, explicitly or implicitly.
We seem to have an innate ability to evaluate and deliberate.
The process seems to start with a question, is it worthwhile? Is
this good or bad? We consider the alternatives, the arguments,
the pros and cons, the consequences, the feelings involved, the
dangers, the fears, the demands. The process seems to come to
a conclusion in a judgment of value: this is the best thing to do
and there follows the implementation in a course of action.
Lonergan’s treatment of values builds on his earlier work on
judgments of truth. In Insight he elaborated a cognitional structure
of three levels of activities: of experiencing, understanding and
judging. It is a brilliant, detailed description of how we actually
come to know. It sums up in a neat formula the investigations
of epistemology since the time of Aristotle. Finally, we have
an answer to the question of what is truth in terms of how we
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Questions for truth are
followed by questions of
value.

actually make a correct judgment of truth. Truth is what you find
when you have examined all the evidence, grasped the connection
between the evidence and the conclusion, no further relevant
questions arise, and you posit a judgment. Lonergan later came to
realize that there is a fourth level of activities involved in knowing
good and evil. We usually do not stop when we have discovered
a truth, a scientific breakthrough, a pure theory. A new discovery
or insight almost inevitably leads to the question of what are
you going to do about it, what are its implications, what is its
worth, how can it be applied, how can science be implemented
in technology. If climate science is correct in diagnosing and
predicting climate catastrophe, then certain courses of action are
called for. They are good if they alleviate the situation, bad if
they make it worse. Science does not end in pure truth but in the
implications, the applications, the changes in human behavior
that are called for. Questions for truth are followed by questions
of value. There are practical implications from most discoveries
in science and philosophy and so cognitional structure needs to
be completed with an elaboration of the question of value, the
deliberative insight and the judgment of value.
What is this process of evaluating? Perhaps a simple,
concrete example of this process might help. Note the activities
of questioning, deliberating and concluding which are always
present. Consider the mental activities we engage in when we set
out to buy a new mobile phone. Intelligence is obviously involved:
we ask, where can I buy one, why do I need one, what functions
does it perform, how much does it cost, where can I get the best
bargain? These are questions of information, understanding and
judgments of truth and value. Are feelings involved? We see
our friends using mobile phones and we want one. We desire,
we want, we need, we aspire to be connected at all times. We
like one color and not another, we admire some functions and
detest some annoyances. We are comfortable with our choice or
uneasy. We can perform these activities well and get a good phone
that satisfies our needs at a good price and we are happy ever
after. Or we perform the activities badly, do not match needs
to functions, and end up returning the phone within a week.
Identifying the activities in the process of buying a mobile phone
is helpful because the same process and activities are involved
in the more difficult judgments of moral value. Already we can
see that knowing and feeling are involved. Already we can see
that there is a process of deliberating, with a beginning in the
question, a middle in the evaluation and a satisfying end in the
judgment of value.
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Are values all the same?

Underpinning the activities we can also perceive the
cognitive, the affective and the volitional elements. Most obvious
is the cognitive element. We ask questions, we seek information,
we compare prices, we learn about apps and functions, we seek
advice from others. But note also the affective element, the
feelings that inform the process. We want, desire, wish for a
new and better phone. We are perhaps envious of our friends,
ashamed of our old-fashioned clunky machine; we are frustrated
with the complications of functionality and price and variety
available. Finally, we are happy with our choice, proud of our
new acquisition, delighted to be in touch with our friends. There
is also the volitional element, the deciding, which is operative
from the beginning in our questioning, in each step forward that
we make to the final decision of paying for the purchase. We can
decide to stop, to reverse, to change direction at any stage of the
process.
Scale of Values
There are many different kinds of values. Above we considered
an example of evaluating which is primarily economic. But the
same process and the same components are involved in moral
evaluations. Are all these values of equal worth? Or are values all
the same? Or is there a chaos of values? One can slice values in
various ways but the most fundamental is to follow the five levels
of conscious activity constitutive of the human person. In that
framework we can distinguish vital, social, cultural, moral and
religious values in a hierarchical, structural scale of values.
Vital values are characteristic of the human person as living,
as sensing, as embodied, as satisfying the needs of sensitive living.
Health, vitality, energy, food, clothing, housing, propagation,
growth, sleep, and the like are examples of vital values. Certain
foods are good for you. Get a good night’s sleep. This will make
you grow big and strong. Vital values loosely correlate with the
level of experiencing. You cannot pick up any magazine without
being given free advice on what to eat, how to exercise, what is
good for your health. We are all familiar with the adage, primum
vivere, deinde philosophare, which might be translated, take care
of vital values and then seek the higher.
Social values are characteristic of the good order of a society.
We are also social animals. There are various ways in which we
structure social relations in a society of specialization of roles,
cooperation, law and order, principles of equality, and the
like. Efficiency, order, differentiation, regularity, cooperation,
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economic use of resources are examples of social values. They
presuppose vital values but in principle are at a higher order as
they loosely correlate with the level of understanding. We satisfy
individual needs only in the context of a well-functioning polis
or society.
Cultural values are the beliefs and values inherent in a way
of life. These values are embodied in the constitution, inculcated
in an educational system, they underpin the judicial system. We
value truth, education, science, technology. We respect the values
of tolerance and freedom and equality. The truth of our history
is embodied in the myths, the institutions, traditions, stories,
songs. Different cultures have various configurations or ways of
expressing these cultural values.
Moral values are the values implicit in our relations to
one another as free and responsible human persons. Moral
values correlate loosely with the level of deciding, valuing and
implementing. This is the good of the individual as he realizes
his freedom as a responsible person. Honesty, tolerance, justice,
responsibility, freedom, equality, respect are examples of moral
values.

To be fully human is to
be more than human.
The human person is by
nature open to the divine
and reaches fulfillment
only in religious selftranscendence.

Religious values trump all other values. To be fully human is
to be more than human. And so homo religiosus (man a religious
being) values holiness, unqualified love, worship, salvation, the
gift of grace, prayer, and the like. The human person is by nature
open to the divine and reaches fulfillment only in religious selftranscendence.
The scale of values helps us to see that there are different
levels of value, and that they are dependent on one another,
the higher presupposing the lower and at the same time going
beyond the lower and introducing something new and more
valuable. Not all values are at the same level. Values are not all
equal. The good is an analogous notion. The division into levels
is not arbitrary but based on our complex nature as sensitive,
intellectual, rational, moral and religious beings.
It also reminds us that values are everywhere. They are
embedded in every activity, every institution, every policy, in
education, politics, laws, courts, governments, banks, hamburger
joints, and the like. It is an illusion to say that anything is valuefree, usually a mask for a secular, relativist, politically correct
agenda. I am claiming that we have the innate potential not only
to know the truth but also to know the good, namely, value.
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Values are not arbitrary preferences as maintained by Emotivists
but really give us objective knowledge of good and evil, value
as true or false. That is not to say that we are always right, that
we never make mistakes. But significantly we can recognize our
mistakes, learn from them and avoid similar goofs in the future.
Intellectual Component
Let us now attend to the process of evaluating and identify
the role of intelligence and the role of feeling. This is the crucial
issue between the emotivists and the rationalists. We take a
middle course between these two extremes asserting the legitimate
constitutive role of both intelligence and feeling. Let us first try
to define the role of intelligence, reflection and deliberation,
judgment, and later assess the role of feelings.
Emotivists in our popular culture assume the position that
values are just expressions of arbitrary preferences guided by
feelings mostly of self-interest. All we have to do to rebut this
position is to attend to how in fact we ask questions about the
worth of something, assemble evidence and information relevant
to seeking an answer, recognize the moment when the intellect
seizes on the sufficiency of the evidence for a conclusion, and
utters the judgment of value. We do not choose a mobile phone
at random on feeling alone; we do not choose a career path on
feeling alone; we do not choose a life partner in marriage on
feeling alone; we do not choose to have or not to have an abortion
on feeling alone. All sorts of relevant questions enter our mind,
set us on a path of seeking relevant information, understanding
and advice and move us towards a judgment. There is a crucial
constitutive intellectual component in knowing the value of a
course of action, a person, or the worth of something.
Once we start asking questions we are using our intelligence
and seeking knowledge. As soon as we are asking questions about
the worth of some thing or action or person we are seeking
knowledge of values. In the moral sphere we ask questions about
right and wrong, good and evil, right courses of actions and
wrong courses of action. We ask about the moral fiber of our
politicians, of our church leaders, of our bankers, of our media.
Are they doing what they should be doing? Are they the kind
of persons we would trust with our money or our children? Are
they people of integrity, of honesty, of justice, of compassion, of
duty? We are abundant in our judgments about people in the
public eye. We seem to be able to reach conclusions about such
people and judgments are the work of intelligence. For the most
part we usually get it right but of course we can make mistakes.
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We can distinguish true
and false values...

We can jump to conclusions, we can be biased, we can follow
conventional wisdom, which may not always be right.
Lonergan recognized the question of value and the judgment
of value but was not clear about what came in between. In Insight
he was very clear on the reflective insight which comes between
the question of truth and the judgment of truth: it is the grasp of
the sufficiency of the evidence and the link between the evidence
and the conclusion. If there is sufficient relevant evidence for
the conclusion, the judgment of truth follows. It is not hard to
notice that at the level of values a similar insight occurs, which
we call the deliberative insight. It is an intellectual grasp of the
sufficiency of the evidence for the value of something. We can
know the value of something or some person. We can have a
knowledge of good and evil. We can distinguish true and false
values in general and in particular. We can judge the worth of
something. Such judgments are not just true for me here and
now and not true for you. They are objective in the sense that the
conclusion rests on evidence that is relevant and sufficient: the
conditions are fulfilled. The value judgment is the conclusion of
an intellectual process of asking questions, assembling arguments
and evidence, and finally coming to a conclusion.
Affective Component
Does this mean that we have adopted a rationalist position?
By no means. What then is the role of feelings in the process of
evaluations, particularly moral judgments? Again we attend to
questions of fact, to our own experience of moral evaluations.
In a class here in Duquesne the students were able to name
more than a hundred feelings within half an hour. Chief among
them were desires, fears, love, hate, remorse, guilt, disgust,
anger, responsibility, unease, tense, stressed, excited, perturbed,
confused, hesitant, confident, and so on and so forth; the list
is endless. Do these feelings enter into the process of moral
deliberation? Of course they do. We are feeling animals. We are
very articulate in naming and distinguishing various feelings.
But how and where and to what extent do they enter into moral
deliberation?
We tend to think in terms of feelings that are good and
feelings that are bad. Lonergan makes much of the distinction
between intentional and non-intentional feelings.3 I do not think
that these are the relevant distinctions we need here. The key
distinction seems to be between (1) feelings which normally
result in self-transcendence and (2) feelings which are morally
ambiguous. This is a distinction Lonergan does make a few
sentences later.4
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(1) What are these feelings which normally tend to
development, to conversion, to knowing and choosing the true
and the good? In Insight Lonergan constantly talks about the
importance of the pure detached unrestricted desire to know. His
whole position on human knowing, the dynamic of the activities,
the intentionality implicit in the activities, rests on the desire to
know. We feel it in our curiosity, our wonder, our questioning,
our searching, our joy in success and our frustration at failure.
Lonergan never explicitly names the desire to know as a feeling.
But if a desire to know is not a feeling what is it? Are not desires
feelings? We feel them, they move us in a certain direction, they
are the mass momentum drive of human living. The desire to
know is one way of identifying the feelings that normally lead
us in the direction of self-transcendence. It is deep, long lasting,
gives direction to our search, leads us to inquire relentlessly for
truth and value. It is what distinguishes us from brute animals.

What role does desire play
in the process of knowing?

What is the role of this desire? Is it extrinsic to the process of
knowing or is it constitutive of the process? I would answer in this
way. Can you imagine a knowing that does not start in a desire
to know expressed in questioning, driving you forward through
research and deliberating, forcing you to make a judgment when
sufficient evidence is grasped, and is content that truth has been
attained. Without the desire to know we do not ask questions
and so do not understand anything. Understanding is a dynamic
activity and the dynamic is provided by the desire to know. Even
Aristotle recognized the active role of intellect in questioning and
its passive role of receiving insights. Aristotle’s active intellect
throws light on images so that we may understand; it initiates
the process of knowing; it is in act rather than in potency. The
active intellect is the pure question. The passive intellect receives,
it is somehow passive. Insight comes suddenly and unexpectedly
as a release of the tension of inquiry; it passes into the habitual
texture of the mind. But the intellect, Aquinas will insist, is
one personal intellect. So we can assert that the desire to know
simply as a feeling is a constitutive element of human knowing
of truth and value. In his later writings, Lonergan shifted to the
terminology of the transcendental precepts to identify more
clearly the feelings that lead to self-transcendence, namely, be
attentive, be intelligent, be reasonably, be responsible, be in love.
(2) Besides those feelings aiming at self-transcendence, there
is a class of feelings which are morally ambiguous; they can lead
in the right direction or not. These are sensitive feelings, feelings
that are biological and involve sensitive, chemical or biological
changes; they are bodily based. They are morally ambiguous in
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the sense that in themselves they are neither good nor bad: it is
only in the context of a free developing moral person knowing,
deciding and acting that such feelings enter into the moral
domain. Anger is an example of such a feeling. One can be filled
with righteous anger over injustice, corruption, discrimination,
child abuse and the like. One should feel angry at such evils. On
the other hand, you have the more selfish anger of road rage,
anger at a crying baby on a plane, anger at what is perceived as
personal slights.
A counselor might ask, how do you feel about that? Are you
comfortable with that? It is a legitimate question. In discerning
our feeling orientation we should be able to distinguish the deep
rooted sense of obligation to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable
and responsible, from the more superficial, sensitive, transient,
ambiguous feelings of desire, attraction, or satisfaction.

We are capable of
knowing what is right
and good but not actually
deciding in line with that
judgment.

Volitional Element
There is yet another central element to be taken into account
when we are judging the value of a course of action and that is
our effective freedom. We are capable of knowing what is right
and good but not actually deciding in line with that judgment.
This is supremely irrational but that is the point where we are not
necessitated to follow our intellect but can choose to turn from
good and do evil. Sin is supremely irrational but it happens all
the time. So we acknowledge the possibility that our judgments
of value are influenced by (1) rationalization when we adjust
our knowledge to suit our actions, by (2) moral renunciation,
when we renounce our ability to do good, and by (3) the flight
from reflection into blind, thoughtless, activism. The notion
of freedom would require a few volumes to explore adequately
but in current culture it is mostly misunderstood as freedom of
choice, freedom to do as you please, lack of constraints, freedom
to follow your bliss, whatever that might be. We need to retrieve
a notion of freedom as self-determination, as responsible, as a
positive dynamic, as deciding for good as opposed to evil.
Conscience
Conscience is a key notion in any contemporary moral
philosophy. Our account of the activities of questioning,
deliberating, judging, deciding and implementing the judgment
as well as the three components of cognitive, affective and
volitional, all unite and help us to understand the notion of
conscience. Conscience is not just a little voice or a feeling of
guilt. It is an awareness of the feeling of moral obligation and
our fidelity or infidelity to that imperative in our deliberation,
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To be human is to be
moral. We are aware of
our good deeds as well as
of our twists and turns
away from the good.

decision and action. Our analysis of knowledge of value has
included an intellectual element, an affective element, and an
element of freedom. Conscience encompasses the whole process
from beginning to end. It is both a feeling and an intellectual
process, unfolding in responsible freedom. To be human is to be
moral. We are aware of our good deeds as well as of our twists
and turns away from the good. Conscience is supreme in the
sense that in the end we are responsible for what we value and
make of ourselves. We decide for ourselves what we are to make
of ourselves.
Conclusion
We used to teach moral philosophy/theology in terms
of giving clear yes or no answers to every imaginable case of
conscience. In the end it is impossible to cover all imaginable
cases. Perhaps it would be better to empower people to make
moral judgments of value for themselves. Talk of values is
legitimate and helpful in today’s moral climate. People are going
to follow what they personally value, sometimes irrespective of
authority or church or culture. Unfortunately, values are often
regarded as passing feelings or as arbitrary choices. However,
there is a sound philosophical underpinning to doing ethics
from the point of view of values. This is foundational in the
sense that we can recognize the activities and the components
involved in good valuing. These capabilities are inherent in every
human person. This approach focusses on the good person as
the standard and criterion of goodness following the lead of
Aristotle5. Good value judgments are the a priori conditions for
the possibility of becoming a good person. A value framework
provides a grid or background from which more proximate or
specific methods of discerning the good either by principles of
natural law or by virtue ethics can be applied. Such an ethic is
appropriate to an age of interiority where we take possession of
our own intellectual, affective and volitional dimensions. Our
attempting to express our values in mission and vision statements
is soundly based both philosophically and theologically.
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